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Foreign Listings and the Preeminence of U.S.
Securities Exchanges: Should the SEC
Recognize Foreign Accounting
Standards?
Michael A. Schneider
On October 5, 1993, after three years of stalemated negotia-
tions and mixed international press,' the German automaker
Daimler-Benz made history by listing its common stock for trad-
ing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).2 The event
marked not only the first German company to list shares on a
U.S. securities exchange, but also the last major industrial coun-
try to have a company listed on a U.S. securities exchange. 3
These two milestones have sparked renewed debate in the
United States over the ability of the U.S. national securities ex-
changes4 to attract foreign securities listings.5
1. See Barry Riley, Feeling of Betrayal in Corporate Germany, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1993, at 27 (describing the listing of Daimler-Benz on the NYSE: "[flor
the German corporate establishment this has been quite a snub") and Anita
Raghavan & Michael R. Sesit, Financial Boom: Foreign Firms Raise More and
More Money in the U.S. Markets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1993, at Al (stating that
the Daimler-Benz decision to list on the NYSE represents a "fundamental shift
in the way U.S. financial markets are viewed abroad").
2. Richard C. Breeden, then-Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, announced that the listing of Daimler-Benz on the NYSE marked
a "new beginning in the world of corporate finance." Richard C. Breeden, Re-
marks Regarding the Listing of Shares of Daimler-Benz in the U.S. Securities
Market 1 (March 30, 1993) (transcript on file with the Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade). Chairman Breeden further characterized the listing as a "win"
for both Daimler-Benz and investors in the United States and worldwide. Id.
3. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN
ISSUERS IN THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES MARKET (May 20, 1993) (on file with
the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade); Breeden, supra note 2, at 3; David
Duffy & Lachlan Murray, The Whooing of American Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb.
25, 1994, at A14 (Mr. Duffy is chairman of a public relations firm that special-
izes in cross-border investor relations).
4. "U.S. national securities exchanges" or "U.S. national exchanges," as
used in this Note, refer to the three securities exchanges in the United States
that offer foreign securities for trading: the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) system. Although NASDAQ is
not an exchange per se, see infra note 13, it is included because of the SEC's
1983 ruling that NASDAQ is the functional equivalent of an exchange for the
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The ability to attract foreign listings is crucial to the contin-
ued preeminence of the U.S. national exchanges. Foreign com-
panies now represent the largest growth opportunity for the
U.S. national exchanges.6 For instance, over 3,000 worldwide
privately-held companies currently meet the listing standards of
the NYSE alone.7 As the "globalization" of capital markets8 con-
purposes of registration and reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See infra note 49. See also infra note 48 (listing the "true" national secur-
ities exchanges located in the United States).
These three U.S. national exchanges co-exist with regional exchanges that
do not offer foreign listings, and the U.S. "pink-sheet" market which is an over-
the-counter securities market that does trade foreign securities. See infra note
13.
5. Compare William Freund, That Trade Obstacle, The SEC, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 1993, at A6 (arguing that "America's anachronistic accounting stan-
dards... will do irreversible harm to the U.S. as the world's dominant financial
center") and William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of
Foreign Security Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, in MODERNIZING U.S. SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 39, 51 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert Kamphuis eds., 1992)
(concluding that "[i]t is difficult to defend a regulatory policy that prevents
[U.S. exchanges] from competing effectively in making markets in foreign se-
curities") with Mary Schapiro, The SEC's Open Door Policy, WALL ST. J., Sept.
23, 1993, at A17 (arguing that the United States "compares favorably" to other
worldwide markets in the number of foreign listings and the recent trend is
even more illustrative of its competitiveness).
6. See Franklin R. Edwards, Listing of Foreign Securities on U.S. Ex-
changes, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION 57, 58 (Kenneth Lehn &
Robert Kamphuis eds., 1992).
7. Letter from Dr. William C. Freund, former chief economist of the NYSE
and current Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for the Study of
Equity Markets at Pace University, to Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Commissioner
(Sept. 27, 1993) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). The po-
tential opportunity in the foreign listings market is staggering considering that
the NYSE now lists only about 2,100 companies. Major Issues Facing the Fi-
nancial Markets: Testimony Before the Securities Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, New York Stock Exchange) (on file with the Minnesota
Journal of Global Trade). Thousands more privately-held foreign companies
would meet the less rigorous listing standards of the NASDAQ and AMEX. See
Letter from Dr. William C. Freund to Mary L. Schapiro, supra.
8. The globalization of securities markets has been primarily driven by
five forces. See Joseph Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities
Markets: Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES
RES. 349 (1990). The first and the most significant force driving transnational
capital flows is pure economics. Id. at 361. Differences in national savings
rates, investment opportunities, and trade imbalances encourage the flow of
capital in the world. Id. Second, increases in computer and telecommunica-
tions technology have fueled a worldwide network of brokers, dealers, and in-
vestors with powerful capabilities to conduct large transactions
instantaneously. Id. at 361-62. Third, the increasing emphasis on global diver-
sification has increased the demand for foreign securities and investments as
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tinues at a record pace, 9 the U.S. national exchanges must
transform themselves into transnational securities exchanges
by offering large numbers of foreign listings. 10 Unless they do
so, the U.S. national exchanges risk being relegated to the sta-
tus of "regional" exchanges which offer only domestic
securities."
Advocates of reform argue, however, that the U.S. national
exchanges are unable to effectively compete for foreign listings.
The chief impediment cited is the requirement that foreign com-
panies comply with U.S. generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP) in order to list on a U.S. national securities
exchange.' 2 By contrast, other major foreign securities markets
investors seek to diversify across economies. Id. at 362-63. Fourth, the explo-
sive growth of derivative securities has increased demand of foreign securities,
as investors use options, futures, and indices to diversify and speculate across
economies. Id. at 364. Fifth, regulatory barriers continue to fall in all major
markets. Id. at 364-65. Worldwide deregulation facilitates international secur-
ities trade by lowering costs and easing access to foreign capital markets. Id.
The United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States have all eased regulatory
requirements in an attempt to provide the most liquid, least regulatory, and
lowest cost market in which to raise capital and trade securities. Id.
9. In 1992, U.S. investors purchased a record $51.5 billion in foreign debt
and equity, up from a previous record of $47 billion in 1991. U.S. Investors
Bought Record Amount Of Foreign Securities In 1992, SIA Says, 25 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 671 (May 7, 1993) (citing the Securities Industry Association).
U.S. investors acquired a net $32.1 billion of foreign equities in 1992, comprised
mainly of $18 billion in European securities and $8.9 billion in Asian securities.
Id.
The record pace continued in 1993. During the first half of 1993, investors
purchased a net $21.7 billion of foreign equities, an amount roughly double the
amount purchased during the first half of 1992. Americans Snap Up Securities
Overseas at Record Pace, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1993, at C1 (citing the Securities
Industry Association). U.S. investors also purchased a record $27.3 billion of
foreign bonds in the first half of 1993 which is more than the total amount
purchased during all of 1992. Id. See also Edwards, supra note 6, at 58-59
(discussing the growth of foreign securities trading throughout the 1980s).
10. Duffy & Murray, supra note 3, at A14; see Edwards, supra note 6, at
58-59.
11. Hearings, supra note 7, at 12 (testimony of William H. Donaldson,
Chairman and Chief Executive Office, New York Stock Exchange).
12. JAMES L. COCHRANE, ASSESSING AND EVALUATING THE CURRENT DiREc-
TIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL LISTINGS 8-9 (New York Stock Exchange Working Pa-
per 93-03, 1993); Joseph McLaughlin, Listing Foreign Stocks On U.S.
Exchanges: Time To Confront Reconciliation?, 24 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES
REG. 91, 91 (1991); see also Freund, supra note 5, at A6 (arguing that "if the
SEC continues to insist that foreign firms abide by America's anachronistic ac-
counting standards, it will do harm to the U.S. as the world's financial center").
Dr. Freund cites numerous reasons in support of relaxing the SEC rules that
require foreign firms to comply with U.S. GAAP standards. First, U.S. inves-
tors already circumvent the paternalistic mission of the SEC by purchasing for-
eign securities. Id. Second, studies indicate that European and Asian markets
1994]
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do not require foreign companies to comply with their domestic
accounting standards, nor does the U.S. "pink-sheet" market 13
require foreign companies to comply with U.S. GAAP
standards.14
In an effort to make the U.S. national exchanges more com-
petitive in the market for foreign listings, the NYSE has actively
led a movement' 5 to exempt foreign companies listed on a U.S.
are equally efficient despite their lower disclosure standards. Id. Thus, inves-
tors do not necessarily benefit from the increased U.S. disclosure requirements.
Third, foreign accounting standards may actually provide more useful informa-
tion because foreign data is often not comparable in U.S. GAAP form. Id.
Fourth, institutional investors are better able than the SEC to acquire mean-
ingful financial data from foreign companies given their increasing power to
affect securities prices. Id. Finally, the protectionist mission of the SEC now
forces U.S. investors to trade abroad at higher costs and without the protection
of U.S. securities law-precisely the opposite effect sought by the SEC. Id.
For a discussion of GAAP and its relation to foreign listings, see infra notes
32, 63.
13. The U.S. securities market is comprised of two distinct markets: the
exchanges and the over-the-counter market. The over-the-counter market is a
dealer market composed of all transactions not executed on an exchange. Louis
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 599-600 (1988). The over-the-
counter market is further divided into "pink-sheet" issues and NASDAQ issues.
The pink-sheet issues are trades that are negotiated for customers between bro-
ker-dealers. Historically, trades were executed on pink slips of paper, hence the
name "pink-sheet" market. NASDAQ issues are also traded between broker-
dealers but real-time price quotes are available on the NASDAQ system. Id. at
599-602. Unlike the pink-sheet market, companies must subscribe and qualify
to be quoted on the NASDAQ system.
The bulk of U.S. securities trades, however, occurs on securities exchanges.
The U.S. exchanges, which include the New York Stock Exchange, American
Stock Exchange, and other regional exchanges, are extremely well-organized
and efficient auction markets. See infra note 48.
14. See infra part I.B.
15. Although the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ each have a substantial
stake in the foreign listings debate, the reform movement is primarily a product
of the NYSE's efforts. SHow-MAo CHEN, U.S. FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR PRIVATE FOREIGN ISSUERS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT EMPIRI-
CAL STUDIES 7-8 (New York Stock Exchange Working Paper No. 92-06, 1993);
COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 8-9. William Donaldson, chairman of the NYSE,
first proposed reforming the SEC's treatment of foreign listings in 1991. CHEN,
supra, at 8.
The SEC has also been involved in the public debate of the foreign listings
issue. Richard Roberts, a Securities and Exchange Commissioner, has been
publicly outspoken about the need to reform the SEC's treatment of foreign list-
ings in the United States. See Richard Y. Roberts, Remarks at the National
Regulatory Services Supervision/Compliance Conference (May 7, 1993) (tran-
script on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). However, the cur-
rent SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, has expressed serious reservations about
the NYSE's proposal. See Written Responses of Arthur Levitt, designate-Chair-
man of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to the Senate Banking Comm.,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Written Responses of Arthur Levitt]
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national exchange from U.S. GAAP standards.16 By exempting
foreign listings from U.S. GAAP standards, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) 17 would thus recognize foreign ac-
counting standards as sufficient to list on a U.S. national ex-
change.' 8 The SEC is now faced with essentially three choices:
(1) to entirely reengineer the disclosure requirements for all
companies, foreign or domestic; 19 (2) to exempt only foreign com-
panies listed on a U.S. national exchange from U.S. GAAP stan-
dards and thereby accept foreign accounting standards; 20 or (3)
to maintain the status quo.
(released following the July 13, 1993 confirmation hearings for now-SEC Chair-
man Arthur Levitt). Chairman Levitt cites investor protection concerns and
the disturbing situation of having U.S. companies subject to more burdensome
accounting standards than foreign companies. Id.
16. COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 8-9.
17. The SEC is authorized by Congress to make such rules and regulations
as necessary to implement U.S. securities law in the Securities Act of 1933 at 15
U.S.C. § 77s, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 15 U.S.C. § 78w. For a
discussion of the SEC's mission, see infra part I.A.
18. The SEC has refused to support or adopt the proposal to recognize for-
eign accounting standards for several reasons: First, U.S. companies would be
disadvantaged in their home market due to the greater registration and report-
ing requirements that would not apply to foreign issuers. SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION, PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN ISSUERS IN THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 3, at 2. Second, investors would be prejudiced
because information essential to their investment decisions would be unavaila-
ble or incomparable. Id. Third, insider trading would be an even greater dan-
ger considering that investors would not be privy to the information regarding
the adjustment and management of net income common in many countries. Id.
Finally, Rule 144A is now available to provide greater access and liquidity to
the private placement securities market. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes
93-98.
19. Freund, supra note 5, at A6; James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities
Laws In The Shadow of International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 157, 169-70 (1992); see also Roberts, supra note 15, at 8-11 (dis-
cussing the foreign listings controversy from the perspective of U.S. issuers,
foreign issuers, and the SEC); Hearings, supra note 7 (testimony of William H.
Donaldson, Chairman and Chief Executive Office, New York Stock Exchange)
(discussing the long-term effects of maintaining the current disclosure system
and the need for immediate action).
20. The NYSE actually supports a less comprehensive exemption which
would exempt only "world-class" issuers from U.S. GAAP standards. Hearings,
supra note 7, at 13; COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 9. World-class issuers would
be the approximately 200 largest non-U.S. companies in terms of revenue, mar-
ket value, and trading volume outside the United States. COCHRANE, supra
note 12, at 9-10. These world-class issuers could be used as a pilot program for
a comprehensive exemption that would later apply to all foreign listings. Id.
In 1991, the SEC took a first step toward recognizing foreign accounting
and disclosure standards when it signed a bilateral agreement with Canada.
Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration
and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Sec. Act Release No. 6902, [1991
1994]
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The outcome of the foreign listings debate will have signifi-
cant long-run effects in the United States considering the vital
role that the national exchanges play in the U.S. economy.21
The exchanges employ thousands of Americans directly and in-
directly, 2 2 and, more importantly, they provide billions of dollars
of capital each year to U.S. businesses. 23 Unless the U.S. na-
tional exchanges remain dominant among the world's capital
markets, U.S. businesses and investors will increasingly utilize
other securities markets to satisfy their capital and investment
needs.24 As a result, the SEC faces increasing pressure to pre-
serve the preeminent position held by the U.S. national ex-
changes, and thereby prevent the loss of another leading U.S.
industry to foreign competition. 25
This Note examines, whether foreign listings should be ex-
empted from U.S. GAAP standards. Part I describes the princi-
pal U.S. securities laws and the options currently available to
foreign issuers. Part II details common criticisms of the U.S.
disclosure system and recent SEC action related to foreign se-
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,812 (June 21, 1991). See infra
part II.B. The SEC adopted a multijurisdictional disclosure system (MJDS)
that allows certain Canadian companies to satisfy SEC registration and report-
ing requirements with disclosure documents prepared in accordance with Cana-
dian standards. Id. The MJDS with Canada is designed to better facilitate
cross-border listings and cash tender and exchange offers. Id.
21. See Written Responses of Arthur Levitt, supra note 15 (describing the
U.S. national exchanges as a "vital asset" to the U.S. economy); see also Baumol
& Malkiel, supra note 5, at 39 (concluding that current SEC rules are "poten-
tially detrimental" to the U.S. economy).
22. The member-companies of the Securities Industry Association alone
employed more than 260,000 persons in 1991. SECURITIES INDUSTRY YEARBOOK
1990-91, at 10-33 (1990).
23. Written Responses of Arthur Levitt, supra note 15. But see LESTER
THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, Eu.
ROPE, AND AMERICA 42-43 (1993) (arguing that the possession of capital by one's
home country is no longer a necessity to economic success due to the ease with
which world capital markets can now be accessed).
24. According to Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 5, when U.S. investors and
businesses transact in foreign markets three direct costs are incurred: the false
sense of familiarity with translated foreign accounting data, higher trading
costs, and the loss of business in the United States. Id. at 42-43. See also Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 12 (testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman and
Chief Executive Office, New York Stock Exchange) (stating that U.S. investors
will be forced to trade in "relatively illiquid foreign markets without the protec-
tions afforded by our domestic markets").
25. Over the past several decades the United States has surrendered its
dominance in numerous industries including automobiles, steel, semiconduc-
tors, consumer electronics, machine-tools, telecommunications equipment, and
various other high-technology industries. See THUROW, supra note 23, at 114-
16, 177-80, 183-88, 193-200.
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curities. Part III describes and evaluates the principal argu-
ments for accepting foreign accounting standards. This Note
concludes that the stringent SEC disclosure requirements, insti-
tuted to protect investors, should be maintained because there is
little evidence that they put the U.S. national exchanges at a
competitive disadvantage to either the U.S. pink-sheet market
or foreign exchanges.
I. SEC REGULATION AND FOREIGN LISTINGS
The ability of the U.S. national exchanges to compete in the
market for foreign listings is inextricably bound with the disclo-
sure requirements of the SEC. Nevertheless, the SEC and the
national exchanges have different motivations and goals with
respect to foreign listings. The national exchanges undoubtedly
seek to maximize their share of the foreign listings market. The
SEC, however, has a more paternalistic mission of protecting in-
vestors, effectuated through the regulation of corporate
disclosure.
A. THE MISSION OF THE SEC
Since 1934, the SEC has been responsible for "maintaining
the efficiency and integrity of the American securities mar-
kets"26 by ensuring "full and fair" disclosure to investors.27 Effi-
ciency in a securities market is achieved by facilitating the
trading process, typically by lowering transaction costs, broad-
ening investor participation, and shortening settlement peri-
ods. 28 Meanwhile, the integrity of a securities market is
maximized by providing investors with accurate, unbiased, and
meaningful financial information.29 While the tradeoffs be-
tween efficiency and integrity are not zero sum, inordinate em-
phasis on one goal will frustrate the other.30 At some point, the
26. THoMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 9 (2d ed.
1990).
27. Rule 146- Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Pub-
lic Offering, Sec. Act Release No. 5487, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2710 (April
23, 1974); KL FRED SKOUSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEC 7, 22 (5th ed. 1991).
28. For a more detailed discussion of the efficiency of securities exchanges,
see infra part III.C.
29. See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGU-
LAITON IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 28-29 (1979) (citing the comments of then-SEC
Chairman A. A. Sommer, Jr.).
30. See Edward A. Perell et al., Regulation S and Rule 144A: A Non-US
Issuer's Perspective, INT'L FIN. L. REV./CoRP. FIN. 13 (Sept. 1990 Supp.); J. Wil-
liam Hicks, Securities Regulation: Challenges in the Decades Ahead, 68 IND.
L.J. 791 (1993).
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costs of compliance to issuers surpass the benefits that addi-
tional disclosure confers to investors.3 1
The SEC has historically emphasized the goal of maximiz-
ing market integrity and investor protection by increasing dis-
closure requirements. 32 However, pressure is now building on
the SEC to bring U.S. disclosure requirements more in line with
the requirements of other major countries3 3 as the globalization
of capital markets continues and the competition among world-
wide exchanges intensifies.34 The SEC readily agrees that dis-
closure costs must be minimized in order to increase foreign
listings in the United States, but it also insists that any reform
must be consistent with the goal of protecting investors. 35
In meeting this goal, the SEC primarily uses the Securities
Act of 193336 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 37 The
31. See Hicks, supra note 30, at 791, 805 (stating that "securities law is
optimal where at any given moment a proper balance is struck between the
private interest, which stresses freedom and efficiency, and the public interest,
which allows for limitations and proscriptions").
32. See KRiPKE, supra note 29, at 28-29. The SEC errs on the side of over-
disclosure because it views the risks of too little disclosure as being significantly
greater than the risks of too much disclosure. R. K MAuTz, FINANciAL DismcO-
SURE IN A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 32 (1978). Indeed, securities regulations were
established to protect investors, not to weigh the impact of disclosure on the
economy. Id. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the group
responsible for establishing U.S. GAAP standards, similarly views the economic
effects of its actions as only an ancillary consideration. FINANcIAL REPORTING
AND CHANGING PRICES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 33, at
26 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1979). FASB perceives its primary function
as the development of standards which properly measure business income and
investment. Id.
33. U.S. disclosure requirements are undoubtedly the most comprehensive
and exacting in the world. For a survey of numerous studies on disclosure
levels, see Gary C. Biddle & Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, The Effects of Financial
Disclosure Levels on Firms' Choices Among Alternative Foreign Stock Exchange
Listings, 1:1 J. OF INT'L FIN. MGMT. & AccT. 55 (1989) [hereinafter Effects of
Financial Disclosure]. In addition, a survey of 142 persons involved in the area
of foreign listings, ranked the following countries from the most to the least
stringent in disclosure requirements: United States, Canada, United Kingdom,
Netherlands, France, Japan, Germany, Switzerland. Gary C. Biddle &
Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, Foreign Stock Listings: Benefits, Costs, and the Ac-
counting Policy Dilemma, AcCT. HORIZONS, Sept. 1991, at 69, 74 n.22 [hereinaf-
ter Foreign Stock Listings].
34. See supra notes 8, 9. See KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 28-29, for a compre-
hensive critique of U.S. disclosure system.
35. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign
Companies, Sec. Act Release No. 7029, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,252, at
84,684 (Nov. 3, 1993) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239, 249) (pro-
posed Nov. 3, 1993).
36. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1988).
37. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a to 7811 (1988).
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Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) deals with the distribu-
tion of securities, while the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act) deals with the trading of securities after
distribution.38 The Securities Act requires that a public offering
or sale of securities be registered with the SEC unless it quali-
fies as an exempted security or transaction. 39 The Securities
Act thereby provides an initial set of disclosure documents for
most securities that are publicly offered or sold. The Securities
Act also prohibits any deceptive or fraudulent practices in the
sale or offering of securities. 40
The Exchange Act governs the post-distribution trading of
securities. 41 The Exchange Act requires that securities be regis-
tered42 with the SEC before any trading occurs on an exchange
In addition to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, federal securities law is comprised of three other statutes enacted in 1939
and 1940. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 applies to public offerings of debt
securities in excess of $10 million. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbb (1988). The Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 requires the registration of investment companies
and also regulates the actions and structure of such companies. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988). Finally, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 regu-
lates the activities of investment advisors. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1988).
38. Loss, supra note 13, at 87.
39. For a discussion of exempted securities versus exempted transactions
and other exemptions available under the Securities Act, see generally Loss,
supra note 13, at 272-349 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
40. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), is a general an-
tifraud section that relates to fraud in the sale or offering of securities, whether
registered or exempt. In general, Section 17(a) makes it unlawful to employ
any scheme to defraud, or engage in any practice which constitutes fraud or
deceit. Id.; see also 3 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL COR-
PORATE LAW § 8.01 (1993).
41. Loss, supra note 13, at 36. The Exchange Act also requires that bro-
ker-dealers, national exchanges, and dealer associations be registered with the
SEC. 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 1.03[1]. In addition, the Exchange Act
formally established the SEC, its structure, and charged it with the administra-
tion of federal securities laws. See generally SKOUSEN, supra note 27, at 7-17
(discussing the origins of the SEC).
42. "Registration under the Securities Act does not constitute registration
under the Exchange Act." HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & HOLME ROGERTS &
OWEN, SECURITIES LAw HANDBOOK § 12.06[1] (1993 ed.) (emphasis added). Nev-
ertheless, previous registration under the Securities Act greatly simplifies re-
gistration under the Exchange Act. Id. A U.S. issuer must register any
nonexempt security under the Exchange Act if (1) the issue is listed on an ex-
change or NASDAQ, or (2) if the issuer has total assets exceeding $5 million
and 500 or more stockholders. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1); Loss, supra note 13, at
405. The Exchange Act originally applied to issuers with total assets in excess
of $1 million, but Rule 12g-1 of the Exchange Act modified the threshold to $5
million. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1993); System of Classification for Purposes of
Exempting Smaller Issuers From Certain Reporting and Other Requirements,
Exchange Act Release No. 18,647, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,046, 17,047 (April 15, 1982).
1994]
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or in an over-the-counter market.43 Upon registration, publicly-
traded companies must adhere to a continuous disclosure sys-
tem by filing quarterly and annual reports. 44 The Exchange Act
thereby provides an ongoing set of disclosure documents for pub-
licly traded companies.
B. FOREIGN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Foreign companies that wish to participate in the U.S. se-
curities market generally choose one of two alternatives. A for-
eign company may have its existing securities listed on a
national securities exchange or traded in the over-the-counter
market-typically in the form of an American Depository Re-
ceipt (ADR).45 Alternatively, a foreign company may go one step
In addition, the category of "exempt" securities under the Exchange Act is
wholly different from those under the Securities Act. See infra note 50.
A U.S. issuer can thus avoid registration and continuous reporting under
the Exchange Act if its security is traded over-the-counter, and has less than
500 shareholders or less than $5 million in total assets. For a description of the
over-the-counter market, see supra note 13. See part I.B.1., for a discussion of
the Exchange Act exemptions available to a foreign issuer.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), (g)(1). For a description of the U.S. securities mar-
ket, securities exchanges, and over-the-counter market, see supra note 13.
44. The principal reports required under the continuous disclosure system
for U.S. issuers are the annual Form 10-K and the quarterly Form 10-Q. 17
C.F.R. § 249.308a, .310 (1993). Form 10-K must be filed within 90 days of the
fiscal year-end, and Form 10-Q must be filed within 45 days of the quarter-end
in all quarters except the year-end quarter. Id.
Companies registered under the Exchange Act must also distribute Annual
Reports to shareholders as part of proxy rules relating to the annual share-
holder meetings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1993). Annual Reports are not re-
quired as part of the filings to the SEC. 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 3.11.
Companies registered under the Securities Act are not required to provide An-
nual Reports to shareholders because proxy rules are not applicable. Id.
45. See generally Harold Schimkat, Note, The SEC's Proposed Regulations
of Foreign Securities Issued in the United States, 60 FORDHAM L. REV., S203,
S205-10 (1990) (discussing ADRs in-depth); GERALD WARFIELD, How To Buy
FOREIGN STOCKS AND BONDS 24-31 (1985). American Depository Receipts are
certificates representing a fractional ownership of a foreign security issued and
traded abroad. Schimkat, supra, at S205. The certificates are issued by a de-
pository institution (i.e., a U.S. bank) with or without the support of the foreign
company. Id. at S205-09. ADRs are "sponsored" if the foreign company partici-
pates in or requests the formation of the ADR, or "unsponsored" if a bank cre-
ates the ADR at the request of brokers or investors. Id. at S206-09. The bank
physically possesses the underlying foreign security to back the ADRs issued.
Id. at S205.
ADRs offer numerous advantages to U.S. investors. Most importantly,
ADRs offer a vehicle through which to own a foreign security in the United
States without having to incur the high transactions costs associated with di-
rectly purchasing foreign securities. Id. at S206. These transactions costs nor-
mally include increased broker fees, longer settlement periods, greater
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further by raising new capital in the United States via a public
offering, and subsequently listing the new security on a national
securities exchange or over-the-counter market.
1. Establishing an American Depository Receipt
A foreign issuer that establishes an ADR in the United
States must choose between listing the ADR on a national secur-
ities exchange or having it traded in the pink-sheet market. 46
The choice is crucial because it often dictates whether a com-
pany must register and continuously report under the Exchange
Act.47 If a foreign company lists an ADR on a national securities
exchange 48 or NASDAQ, 49 it must register and report under the
exchange rate exposure, and the management fees associated with interna-
tional mutual funds. Id. ADRs also offer the added benefit of being denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars and paying dividends in U.S. dollars. Id.
Historically, ADRs were issued as a means to avoid burdensome U.S. dis-
closure laws. In 1983, however, the SEC recognized ADRs as a distribution of
securities in the United States. Therefore, ADRs are now subject to the regis-
tration and reporting requirements of Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, unless specifically "exempted." Id. at S207. See infra part
I.B.1.
46. See Schimkat, supra note 45, at S203, S205-10. For a discussion of the
U.S. pink-sheet market and the U.S. capital markets, see supra note 13.
47. The choice is also important because foreign companies that register
under the Exchange Act must also submit to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 101-04, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-(1), (2), 78ff(a),
(c) (1988)). RIcHARD W. JENNINGS, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES &
MATERIALS 1578 (7th ed. 1992). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 pro-
vides criminal penalties for corrupt practices to the extent that U.S. jurisdiction
is possible. Id. In addition, the act requires that foreign companies establish
and maintain an accurate and adequate internal accounting system so that ac-
counting records "reflect transactions in conformity with accepted methods of
recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush fund[s]
and payments of bribes." BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 42, § 22.05.
48. There are eight active registered national exchanges in the United
States. 1991 SEC ANN. RPT. at 25. The exchanges include two national ex-
changes-the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Ex-
changes (AMEX)-and other smaller regional exchanges such as the Pacific
Stock Exchange (PSE) and the Midwest Stock Exchange (MSE). See Loss,
supra note 13, at 597-99.
49. Prior to 1983, foreign securities traded on NASDAQ could avoid Ex-
change Act registration and reporting under Rule 12g3-2(b). See infra notes 53-
54 and accompanying text. On October 6, 1983, however, the SEC eliminated
the exemption for NASDAQ issues. Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release
No. 20,264, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83,435 (Oct.
6, 1983). The SEC did so "because of its belief that foreign issuers whose securi-
ties are traded in the United States as a result of voluntary acts taken by the
issuer should be subject to substantially the same disclosure requirements as
[a] U.S. issuer." 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.13[4]. All foreign issu-
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Exchange Act.50 However, if a foreign company has an ADR
traded in the pink-sheets, registration may not be required.
A foreign company with an ADR traded in the pink-sheets
can avoid Exchange Act registration and reporting requirements
in three ways. First, if the issue has less than 500 total share-
holders, or the foreign company has less than $5 million in total
assets, the company is not required to register or report under
the Exchange Act.5 ' Second, if the issue has less than 300
shareholders who are residents of the United States, the issuer
is also exempt.52 Finally, a foreign issuer that is unable to meet
either of the first two threshold tests can obtain a Rule 12g3-2(b)
exemption.5 3 To qualify for a Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption, a for-
eign company must agree to submit to the SEC on a current ba-
sis all material information that is made public in the company's
home country, filed with a foreign stock exchange, or provided to
foreign shareholders.5 4 Unless a foreign company is traded in
the pink-sheet market and meets one of these three exemptions,
the company is required to register and report under the Ex-
change Act.
Foreign companies required to register and continuously re-
port under the Exchange Act use Form 20-F to file annual re-
ers already trading on the NASDAQ, except Canadian issuers, retained the ex-
emption by virtue of a grandfather clause granted to prevent a sudden
withdrawal of NASDAQ foreign issuers. Id. Existing Canadian issuers were
permitted to rely on the exemption only until January 1, 1986. Thereafter, Ca-
nadian issuers were required to register and report under the Exchange Act.
Id.
50. In combination, Section 12(a) and 12(b) of the Exchange Act make a
registration mandatory for any security listed on a national securities exchange
or NASDAQ. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) to (b). Section 12(a) makes it unlawful to trade
any security on a national securities exchange unless it is registered pursuant
to Section 12(b). Id. § 781(a). There are a few instances where a security may
be listed as an "exempted security" on a national securities exchange without
registration, such as governmental securities. Nevertheless, "for all practical
purposes there is no exemption from registration under the Exchange Act for
securities listed on a national securities exchange." BLOOMENTHAL, supra note
42, § 12.05; see also supra note 49 (discussing the exemption once available
under Rule 12g3-2(b) for NASDAQ issues).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1993); Loss, supra note 13,
at 69.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (1993).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1993); Loss, supra note 13, at 70. Until
1983, ADRs traded on NASDAQ were also able to obtain a Rule 12g3-2(b) ex-
emption. Id. at 71; see supra note 49.
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1993); Loss, supra note 13, at 71. See gener-
ally 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.13[3][a] (discussing the exemptions
available to foreign issuers under the Exchange Act).
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ports.55 Form 20-F is not required to conform to U.S. GAAP
standards. Form 20-F may instead conform to the accounting
standards of the issuer's home country.56 However, a foreign
company must discuss and quantify any material variations in
the income statement or balance sheet so as to reach similar re-
sults under U.S. GAAP standards. 57 In filing Form 20-F, for-
eign companies can therefore incorporate their Annual
Reports58 with only partial reconciliation to U.S. GAAP stan-
dards. Nevertheless, the partial reconciliation to U.S. GAAP
standards required for an ADR still represents significantly
more disclosure than is required in other foreign markets.5 9
Although U.S. companies must file quarterly statements
(Form 10-Q) in addition to their annual statement (Form 10-K),
foreign companies with ADRs are not required to do so. 60 For-
eign companies must instead provide U.S. investors with equal
dignity via Form 6-IK6 1 Form 6-K, like Exchange Act Rule
12g3-2(b), requires that a foreign company disclose all material
55. 17 C.F.R. § 249.240f (1993).
56. 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.13[l][c]. However, Form 20-F
must conform to or be fully reconciled with U.S. GAAP standards if the foreign
company has conducted a public offering under the Securities Act. Id.; see infra
part I.B.2.
57. 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.13[1][c]. The SEC will consider
simplifications or modifications on Form 20-F on a case-by-case basis for foreign
companies unless the company is subject to the Exchange Act due to a public
offering. Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issu-
ers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,371, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 82,363 (Nov. 29, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132 (1979).
58. An Annual Report is distinct from an annual SEC filing such as Form
20-F. Annual Reports are reports distributed at annual shareholder meetings
where company directors are elected. Besides including the basic financial
statements, an Annual Report is "largely an unstructured document in which
management is free to report what it chooses." BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 42,
§ 5.04. The annual Form 20-F under the Exchange Act may incorporate by ref-
erence the Annual Report, but the Annual Report is not sufficient if the Form
20-F is used as the principal document for a registration under the Securities
Act on Form F-3 because it does not contain all the required information. Id.
§ 31.02, at 31-10, -11.
59. JENNINGS, supra note 47, at 1577.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1993). Regardless of SEC regulations, the
NYSE and AMEX exchanges require quarterly reports from their members,
subject to individual exceptions. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Ap-
proving Proposed Rule Changes by the American Stock Exchange, Inc. and New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. To Amend the Exchanges' Listing Standards for For-
eign Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June
23, 1987); JENNINGS, supra note 47, at 1577-78. See generally Loss supra note
13, at 429-33 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the general requirements for list-
ing on the NYSE and AMEX).
61. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-16, 249.306 (1993).
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information that is made public in the company's home country,
filed with a foreign stock exchange, or provided to foreign
shareholders.6 2
2. Conducting a Public Offering
Foreign companies that raise capital through an initial or
secondary public offering must fully conform to U.S. GAAP stan-
dards.63 A public offering is therefore much more burdensome
in terms of registration and reporting than simply establishing
an ADR based on an existing security.
Under the Securities Act, a foreign company conducting its
first public offering must register and file Form F-1.6 4 Form F-1
requires that financial statements be prepared according to U.S.
GAAP standards or provide a full reconciliation to U.S. GAAP
standards. The statements must include all supplemental infor-
mation that is required only in the United States such as execu-
tive compensation, segmented financial data, and transactions
between management and the corporation. 65 A foreign company
may incorporate its Annual Report by reference in Form 20-F,
but it must still fully reconcile all financial information to U.S.
GAAP standards under the Securities Act.66 A public offering
also subjects a foreign issuer to the reporting requirements of
the Exchange Act.6 7
Whether a foreign company conducts a public offering in the
United States or establishes an ADR, it will be subject to much
greater disclosure requirements than in other countries.68
Therefore, the choice between simply listing an existing security
62. Form 6-K, General Instruction B., 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,812.
63. 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.13[1][c]; see also BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 42, §§ 31.02-.04 (discussing the options available to foreign issuers
on Form 20-F and Forms F-1-2-3-4).
U.S. GAAP standards go beyond most foreign accounting standards by re-
quiring detailed information on segmented financial data, pension liabilities
and other under-funded liabilities, depreciation and amortization, business
combinations, deferred and capitalized costs, extraordinary items, discontinued
operations, and changes in accounting methods. SEC DIVIsIoN OF CORPORATE
FINANCE, SuRVEY OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT RECONCILIATIONS BY FOREIGN REG-
IsTRANrs 3-7 (1993).
64. Form F-1, General Instruction I.A., 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 6,952;
see also 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.13[l][c], [2][a].
65. Form F-1, supra note 64; 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40,
§ 15.13[1][c], [2][a]; see SEC DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 63, at
3-7; see also supra note 63.
66. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 42, § 31.03, at 31-12.
67. Sec. Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988).
68. See supra note 33.
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or actually conducting a public offering is one which foreign is-
suers will evaluate in terms of the marginal costs and benefits of
gaining access to U.S. capital.6 9
II. CRITICISMS OF THE U.S. DISCLOSURE SYSTEM AND
RECENT SEC RESPONSES
The primary criticism of the U.S. disclosure system is that
requiring foreign issuers to abide by onerous U.S. GAAP stan-
dards constitutes a significant barrier to entry to U.S. capital
markets. 70 The NYSE and other advocates of reform (reform-
ists) claim that current disclosure standards thwart the ability
of the U.S. national exchanges to compete for foreign listings. 71
As a result, reformists contend that the long-run competitive-
ness of the U.S. national exchanges is in jeopardy, especially as
other worldwide exchanges become increasingly more
attractive. 72
A. DETERRENTS To FOREIGN LISTINGS
Although the primary criticism of the U.S. disclosure sys-
tem is that foreign issuers are required to comply with U.S.
GAAP standards, reformists also emphasize several other fac-
tors that purportedly deter foreign issuers from raising capital
or listing securities in the United States. 73 Reformists assert
that foreign issuers must also: (1) incur added delay in getting
offers to market due to the lengthy registration procedures re-
quired under the Securities Act of 1933;7 4 (2) participate in the
costly continuous disclosure system under the Securities Ex-
69. See Biddle & Saudagaran, Foreign Stock Listings, supra note 33, at 69-
74, for a detailed discussion of the costs and benefits evaluated by a foreign
issuer.
70. Edwards, supra note 6, at 58; Freund, supra note 5, at A6; see also
Raghavan & Sesit, supra note 1, at Al (reporting the wave of foreign issues in
the United States and the continuing criticism of SEC requirements).
71. Edwards, supra note 6, at 70; Freund, supra note 5, at A6.
72. Edwards, supra note 6, at 70; Freund, supra note 5, at. A6. Some re-
formists argue that the NYSE has already lost its status as the world's premier
exchange, and now shares that status with the stock exchanges in Tokyo,
London, and Frankfurt. E.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, SEC Crimps Big Board's Fu-
ture, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1992, at A10. Furthermore, some claim that the
NYSE has already lost much of its dominance in the United States. Id. In
terms of trading volume, the NYSE's share of U.S. trading fell to 59% in 1991
from over 80% in the late 1970s. Id.
73. For a discussion of foreign issuers' objections to the U.S. reconciliation
requirement, see McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 94.
74. JENNINGS, supra note 47, at 1573.
19941 315
MiNN J GLOBAL TRADE
change Act of 1934;75 (3) develop and maintain an internal ac-
counting system that provides accurate and adequate financial
records; 76 (4) disclose sensitive business information, such as ex-
ecutive compensation, that would not otherwise be available in
foreign markets;77 (5) subject themselves to broader civil liabil-
ity under the antifraud provisions of the securities acts and
other U.S. class action suits; 78 and (6) subject themselves to
broader criminal prosecution for any corrupt or misleading prac-
tices under statutes such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977.79
These types of costs, however, are not unique to the United
States. Foreign exchanges have many similar requirements, but
typically not to the extent of the U.S. securities markets.80 A
foreign issuer's decision of where to raise capital or list securi-
ties is based on an evaluation of the costs and benefits of each
market.8 ' Although the costs associated with a U.S. listing or
offering are not increasing,8 2 reformists insist that the benefits
are declining relative to the benefits of other countries. They
claim that the relative decline in benefits is a result of increased
liquidity, greater depth, and decreasing transaction costs in for-
eign capital markets.8 3 In other words, foreign exchanges are
steadily approaching the capabilities of U.S. exchanges in terms
75. See COCHRANE, supra note 12; Edwards, supra note 6.
76. See supra note 47.
77. See supra part I.B.2. and note 63.
78. For example, one out of every fourteen companies listed on the NYSE
was subject to a securities fraud suit from 1988 to 1991. Vincent O'Brien, The
Class Action Shakedown Racket, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991, at A20. Contrary
to popular belief, it is not young and small companies that are usually the sub-
ject of these lawsuits. Over 75% of the companies sued during this period were
in existence for over 10 years, and companies with $30 billion in annual reve-
nues were just as likely to be sued as a $10 billion company. Id. See generally
3D BLOoMENHAL, supra note 40, § 15.13[5] (discussing the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the antifraud provision contained in U.S. securities laws).
79. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1494; see supra note 47.
80. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An
Approach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies,
16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 149, 149 (1993) (asserting that even though
Japanese securities law is based on the U.S. securities law of the 1930s, "[i]t is
well documented that the U.S. mandatory disclosure requirements are far more
demanding in breadth and detail than those of Japan and other developed
countries").
81. See Biddle & Saudagaran, Foreign Stock Listings, supra note 33, at 69-
74.
82. With the SEC's recent actions and proposals related to foreign securi-
ties, the costs of a U.S. listing or public offering may actually be declining. See
infra part II.B.
83. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 6, at 58.
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of size, depth, trading costs, and efficiency, but at lower costs to
a foreign issuer. Therefore, reformists contend that the U.S. na-
tional exchanges suffer from an increasing competitive disad-
vantage vis-a-vis foreign listings.8 4
B. RECENT SEC ACTION
The SEC has stated that one of its top priorities is "achiev-
ing a truly global market system."8 5 As part of its efforts, the
SEC has taken deliberate and measured steps in the last decade
to relax foreign securities requirements, thereby increasing the
worldwide competitiveness of U.S. national securities ex-
changes. Beginning in 1982, the SEC extended the integrated
disclosure system to foreign issuers.8 6 The integrated disclosure
system is designed to simplify the duplicative disclosure re-
quired by the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.87
In 1991, the United States established a multijurisdictional
disclosure system (MJDS) with Canada.8 8 The MJDS permits
certain Canadian companies to prepare and submit disclosure
documents under the Canadian disclosure system for an exten-
sive array of securities transactions.8 9 The SEC has recently
proposed a similar multijurisdictional disclosure system with
the United Kingdom. 90 Although these agreements indicate a
willingness on the part of the SEC to recognize foreign disclo-
sure standards, Canada and the United Kingdom were easy first
steps because of the similarity of their disclosure requirements
and regulatory systems to those in the United States.9 1 The
United States is unlikely to reach similar MJDS agreements
84. See id., supra note 6, at 58, 70; Freund, supra note 5, at A6.
85. Securities and Exchange Commission, Policy Statement on Regulation
of International Securities Markets (Nov. 14, 1988 Press Release) (cited in 3D
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.1511]).
86. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Sec. Act Re-
lease No. 6437, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,407 (Nov. 19, 1982).
87. SKOUSEN, supra note 27, at 46. "The system is based on the belief that
a single, comprehensive reporting system, one that integrates the requirements
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, as well as those of shareholders' reports, will im-
prove financial reporting in general and reduce the costs of compliance." Id.
88. Sec. Act Release No. 6902, supra note 20.
89. See 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.1511].
90. Regulatory Flexibility Agenda and Rules Scheduled for Review, Sec.
Act Release No. 6909, 56 Fed. Reg. 203, 203 (Sept. 12, 1991); see also 3D BLOO-
MENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.15[1] (discussing the countries that are likely to
be chosen as candidates for future MJDS agreements with the United States).
91. 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.15[1].
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with nations such as Germany, whose disclosure standards and
regulatory systems are markedly different.9 2
The most significant actions related to foreign securities
came in 1990. The first was the adoption of Rule 144A 93 which
permits the resale of privately placed securities 94 to qualified in-
stitutional buyers (QIBs)95 without registration under the Se-
curities Act.96 Although private placements were already the
primary method used by foreign firms to raise capital in the
United States,97 Rule 144A partially removed the most signifi-
cant restraint on privately placed securities-the difficulty of
reselling the security once purchased. Rule 144A therefore cre-
ates greater liquidity in the private placement market by per-
mitting resale to QIBs.98 In addition, although Rule 144A
applies to domestic as well as foreign privately placed securities,
it represents a significant step toward further increasing foreign
participation in U.S. capital markets.
92. Cf. id. (discussing that the SEC seeks to form agreements with coun-
tries most similar to the U.S. disclosure and regulatory systems). Germany's
disclosure system, for example, is diametrically different from the U.S. system.
Duffy & Murray, supra note 3, at A14. The German practice of stockpiling prof-
its in hidden or "reserve" accounts for later use is a legitimate German account-
ing practice, but one that is prohibited under U.S. GAAP standards. John
Schmid, Daimler-Benz Reports First-Ever Loss, Reflecting New Accounting,
Lower Sales, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1993, at A10. For example, Daimler-Benz
used "reserved" earnings to avoid ever reporting a loss, even in the worst of
times. Duffy & Murray, supra note 3, at A14. When it entered the U.S. market
in 1993, however, it was forced to report its first-ever loss under stricter U.S.
GAAP standards. Id; Schmid, supra.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1993). Rule 144A was adopted on April 23, 1990
and became effective immediately. Resale of Restricted Securities, Sec. Act Re-
lease No. 6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,523
(April 23, 1990).
94. Privately placed securities are securities sold directly to a small
number of individual or institutional investors such as pension funds and insur-
ance companies. The primary advantage of private placements is that they are
not subject to SEC disclosure requirements. See, e.g., EUGENE F. BRIGHAM &
Louis C. GAPENSKI, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 579-80
(6th ed. 1991).
95. In most cases, qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are institutions
with over $100 million invested in securities. So Are Investors Ready For
144A?, INT'L FIN. L. REV./CoRP. FIN. 3 (Sept. 1990 Supp.). QIBs are typically
mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and money managers. Id.
96. Perell, supra note 30, at 15.
97. In 1989, foreign companies privately placed $24.1 billion compared to
only $10.3 billion in public offerings. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Foreign Issuer Private Placements and Registered Offerings (1993) (on file with
the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). In fact, since 1985 the volume of pri-
vate placements has consistently been one and one-half to two times the
amount of private offerings. See id.
98. Perell, supra note 30, at 14.
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The second major action in 1990 was the adoption of Regu-
lation S.99 Regulation S limits the applicability of the Securities
Act by providing a safe harbor for "offshore" securities distribu-
tions. 100 Regulation S codifies the general principle that "offers
and sales of securities occurring outside the United States are
not subject to the registration requirements of the Securities
Act."101 Thus, under Regulation S, the long-arm of the Securi-
ties Act does not grant U.S. jurisdiction over most offshore dis-
tributions. In combination, Rule 144A and Regulation S will
open a major market for offshore issues (pursuant to Regulation
S) that can be resold to QIBs in the United States (pursuant to
Rule 144A) without the typical private placement market re-
strictions or delays. 0 2
In 1993, the SEC proposed to streamline the reconciliation
process for foreign companies. 10 3 The proposal would require
foreign companies to reconcile financial data for only the previ-
ous two years, rather than the current requirement of five
years. 10 4 The SEC would also accept cash flow statements pre-
pared in accordance with International Accounting Standards,
rather than U.S. GAAP standards.'0 5 Finally, six supplemental
financial schedules would be eliminated from the reporting pro-
cess because the SEC considers the information provided in
these schedules insufficient to justify the costs of reconcilia-
tion.10 6 According to the SEC, these three provisions are part of
its "ongoing efforts" to ease the entry of foreign companies into
the U.S. disclosure system and lower the costs of compliance. 10 7
99. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-.904 (1993). Regulation S was adopted on April 24,
1990 and became effective immediately. Offshore Offers and Sales, Sec. Act
Release No. 6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,524 (April 24, 1990).
100. To qualify as an offshore transaction (1) the offer must be made to a
person not in the United States, and (2) the buyer must not place the order in
the United States, or the seller must at least "reasonably believe" that the
buyer is not in the United States when placing the buy order. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.902(i) (1993); 3D BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 15.12[6][a].
101. KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 17.
102. One hundred eighty-four foreign companies have raised capital in Rule
144A transactions since its adoption in April 1990. Sec. Act Release No. 7029,
supra note 35, at 84,684. Twelve of those companies later entered the U.S. pub-
lic markets for the first time. Id.
103. Sec. Act Release No. 7029, supra note 35.
104. Id. at 84,686.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 84,689.
107. Id. at 84,684. The proposal would also ease the entry of foreign issuers
into the U.S. markets by (1) increasing the number of firms eligible to use the
short-form and full shelf registration pursuant to the Securities Act, (2) provid-
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These steps demonstrate that the SEC recognizes the im-
portance of foreign securities in the United States.l0 They fur-
ther indicate that the SEC is keenly aware of the crucial role
that foreign listings and public offerings play in the ability of
U.S. capital markets to remain internationally competitive. 10 9
III. RECOGNIZING FOREIGN ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS: ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
The SEC now stands at a critical juncture in determining
the future role that U.S. exchanges will play in the international
securities markets. 110 Reformists contend that recognizing for-
eign accounting standards is the principal means of preserving
the preeminent position of the U.S. national exchanges."' The
SEC's key challenge is to determine whether recognizing foreign
accounting standards will increase foreign listings in the United
States without unraveling the strength and integrity of U.S.
capital markets or jeopardizing U.S. investor safeguards.
A. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL "Two-TIER" MARKETS
FOR FOREIGN LISTINGS
The U.S. national exchanges compete for foreign listings in-
ternationally as well as domestically. Internationally, the U.S
national exchanges compete for foreign listings with other major
exchanges such as those in London, Tokyo, and Frankfurt. Do-
mestically, the U.S. national exchanges compete for foreign list-
ing a new safe harbor for company announcements vis-a-vis exempt offerings or
unregistered offshore offerings, and (3) expanding protection for analyst reports
relating to large foreign companies traded offshore. See id. at 84,684-87,
84,689-90.
108. See Written Responses of Arthur Levitt, supra note 15; see also supra
text accompanying note 85.
109. See, e.g., Written Responses of Arthur Levitt, supra note 15.
110. Hearings, supra note 7, at 1 (testimony of William H. Donaldson,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, New York Stock Exchange).
It has been 20 years since Congress last conducted a thorough exami-
nation of these markets, an examination that led to the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975.... [Tlhe focus can no longer be solely on the
competitiveness of the markets that operate within our borders.
Rather, the competition in which we engage has become truly interna-
tional.... We must provide our financial markets with every opportu-
nity to compete as effectively as possible in this new environment....
At the same time, we must also ensure that our markets continue to
provide the high level of investor protection that has always been the
hallmark of the U.S. market system.
Id. at 1-2.
111. See Freund, supra note 5; COCHRANE, supra note 12; McLaughlin,
supra note 12.
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ings with the U.S. pink-sheet market. Both markets are similar,
however, as each is essentially a "two-tier" market. The interna-
tional and domestic markets each have one tier that requires
foreign companies to fully comply with the exchange's domestic
accounting standards; each market also has another tier that
recognizes a company's home country accounting standards. In
both the international and domestic markets, the U.S. national
exchanges occupy the "reporting" tier because of the SEC's re-
quirement that foreign companies comply with U.S. GAAP stan-
dards in order to trade on a U.S. national exchange.
1. The U.S. Rivalry: The National Exchanges and the Pink-
Sheet Market
The distinguishing factor between the two tiers of the U.S.
market is whether or not a company is obligated to report to the
SEC under the Exchange Act. The first tier consists of "report-
ing" foreign companies which are primarily listed on the na-
tional exchanges and NASDAQ. 11 2 The second tier consists of
"non-reporting" foreign companies which can be traded only in
the over-the-counter pink-sheet market. 113 Foreign companies
listed on the "reporting" tier are required to reconcile or conform
their financial statements to U.S. GAAP standards. Conversely,
foreign companies traded on the "non-reporting" tier are not re-
quired to report to the SEC or conform to U.S. GAAP stan-
dards. 114  Home-country accounting standards are thus
acceptable for non-reporting companies.
Reformists insist that by requiring foreign companies to rec-
oncile or conform to U.S. GAAP standards in order to list on a
national exchange, the SEC has created a distinct competitive
advantage for the pink-sheet market.115 Reformists cite the fact
112. Although the vast majority of reporting foreign companies are listed on
the national exchanges or NASDAQ, there are also foreign companies traded in
the pink-sheet market that report to the SEC. As of August 31, 1993, there
were 124 foreign companies traded in the pink-sheet market reporting to the
SEC. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FOREIGN REPORTING ISSUERS LISTED ON MA-
JOR EXCHANGES AND THE COMBINED U.S. MARKETS, Aug. 31, 1993 (on file with
the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION, supra note 3, at 5.
113. See supra note 13. Before October 1983, foreign companies traded on
the NASDAQ were not required to report to the SEC under Rule 12g3-2(b). The
SEC then eliminated the exemption for NASDAQ issues so that now any com-
pany listed on a national exchange or NASDAQ must report to the SEC. Ex-
change Act Release No. 20,264, supra note 49; see supra note 49.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
115. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 62-63; COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 7;
McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 91.
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that over the past decade the number of non-reporting foreign
companies has significantly increased in the United States. 116
For instance, from 1983 to 1992 the number of non-reporting
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) nearly tripled from 335 to
922.117 Not surprisingly, as the number of ADRs traded in the
pink-sheets tripled, the national exchanges began the movement
to reform SEC disclosure requirements. 118 Thus, the debate
over foreign listing disclosure requirements is a product of the
battle for market share in the foreign listings market. 119
Besides the significant increase of foreign issues in the
pink-sheet market, reformists also cite the history of foreign list-
ings on NASDAQ as evidence of the competitive advantage now
enjoyed by the pink-sheet market. 120 From 1977 to 1982, the
number of foreign issues quoted on NASDAQ more than tripled
from 85 to 294.121 However, from 1983, when NASDAQ joined
the "reporting" tier upon losing its Rule 12g3-2(b) reporting ex-
emption, 122 to 1991, the number of foreign issues fell to 213.123
Reformists maintain that the decline in foreign listings on
NASDAQ is a direct result of the added costs of SEC reporting
under U.S. GAAP. 124 In light of the increase in foreign issues
traded in the pink-sheet market, and the simultaneous decline
in NASDAQ foreign listings after it joined the "reporting" tier,
reformists argue that the benefits associated with a national ex-
change listing are not great enough to compensate for the in-
creased costs associated with SEC reporting and compliance
116. Edwards, supra note 6, at 63; COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 7.
117. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, REPORTING AND NON-REPORTING ADRs
(1993) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
118. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 7, at 11-13 (testimony of William H.
Donaldson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, New York Stock Exchange).
Chairman Donaldson stated that until worldwide harmonization of accounting
standards occurs, "a necessary interim solution is to develop a system of global
recognition of accounting standards." Id. at 2.
119. In recent years, for example, the NYSE has captured only one out of
every five foreign listings in the United States. Richard C. Breeden, The
Globalization of Law and Business in the 1990's, Keynote Speech at the Wake
Forest Law Review 1993 Business Law Symposium (Apr. 2, 1993), in 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 509, 516 (1993). However, Richard Breeden, a former SEC
Chairman, recently stated that this "is not an American problem; it is a prob-
lem for the New York Stock Exchange. While such facts might concern the
United States, one must remember that the national interest entails more than
the interest of any organization." Id.
120. COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 7-8; Edwards, supra note 6, at 63.
121. COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 7-8; Edwards, supra note 6, at 63.
122. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
123. Edwards, supra note 6, at 63.
124. See, e.g., id. at 59, 63.
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with U.S. GAAP standards. 125 Therefore, to correct the imbal-
ance between the costs and benefits of a national exchange list-
ing, the costs of an exchange listing must be lowered by
accepting home-country accounting standards.
For a foreign issuer, the costs associated with each tier in
the United States are undoubtedly imbalanced. By listing on a
national exchange, a foreign issuer must register and report
under the Exchange Act and thereby incur substantial costs. 126
By trading in the pink-sheet market, however, a foreign com-
pany avoids the costs associated with SEC reporting and regis-
tration according to U.S. GAAP. 127 Nevertheless, the pink-sheet
market offers significantly less in benefits. The pink-sheet mar-
ket provides no real-time price quotes, no last-sale reporting,
and substantially lower liquidity than the national exchanges or
NASDAQ. 128 Investors are also forced to pay large bid-ask
spreads 129 on each trade in the pink-sheet market.130 By con-
trast, the national exchanges offer access to the most efficient,
deep, and liquid exchanges in the world. 131 Investors thereby
benefit from lower transactions costs, faster settlement, and
broader participation. 132 Reformists contend, however, that the
history of foreign issues quoted on NASDAQ, and the simultane-
ous growth of ADRs traded in the pink-sheet market, illustrate
that the costs of a national exchange listing are even greater
than the benefits.133 Reformists conclude that because the ben-
efits of an exchange listing are accompanied by even greater
costs, the pink-sheet market is preferable to foreign issuers.' 34
The evidence cited by reformists, however, provides an in-
complete picture. The focus on the absolute growth of the for-
eign issues traded in the pink-sheet market ignores the
simultaneous growth in foreign issues traded on national ex-
125. See id.
126. See supra part II.A.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
128. Edwards, supra note 6, at 62. See also Loss, supra note 13, at 599-602
(1988 & Supp. 1992) (comparing the OTC or pink-sheet market to the national
exchanges).
129. A spread in the over-the-counter market is the difference between the
bid and asked prices for a security, and represents a dealer's profit. BRIGHAM &
GAPENSKI, supra note 94, at 71 n.2.
130. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 6, at 64.
131. See generally 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 3.09[3] (discussing the
advantages of an exchange listing from the perspective of the issuer and
investor).
132. Id. § 3.09[3][b].
133. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
134. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 58, 63.
1994]
M2N J.. GLoBAL TRADE
changes (reporting issuers).13 5 A more complete analysis com-
pares the relative, as opposed to absolute, number of foreign
issues traded on each tier. This analysis reveals that the
number of reporting foreign issues has experienced a similar
growth rate to that of non-reporting foreign issues.
For example, although the number of non-reporting ADRs
has tripled in the last decade, the ratio of ADRs traded in the
pink-sheet market (non-reporting) to the number of exchange-
listed ADRs (reporting) has remained constant. In 1983, there
were 335 non-reporting ADRs and 165 reporting ADRs, approxi-
mately a 2:1 ratio of non-reporting to reporting ADRs. 136 From
1983 to 1988, however, the number of non-reporting ADRs rose
to 1,684, increasing the ratio of non-reporting to reporting ADRs
to almost 5:1.137 This tremendous growth period for non-report-
ing ADRs, not surprisingly, is the time period emphasized by
reformists.138
By 1993, however, the number of non-reporting ADRs had
decreased from 1,684 to 922, while the number of reporting
ADRs had increased from 343 to 442.139 The approximate ratio
of non-reporting to reporting ADRs has thus returned to 2:1.
More importantly, the trend over the last five years indicates
that the ability of the U.S. exchanges to attract foreign issues
has substantially improved as compared to the pink-sheet mar-
ket. The relative numbers of foreign issues on each tier there-
fore provide an entirely different picture than that normally
painted by reformists.
Moreover, even using the absolute numbers cited by reform-
ists, there is a record level of activity now occurring on the na-
tional exchanges. In 1992, a record sixteen foreign companies
listed on the NYSE alone. 140 This record was surpassed in 1993
when thirty-seven foreign companies listed on the NYSE.141
The trend is likely to continue. Latin American companies, for
135. See, e.g., id. at 62-63.
136. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 117.
137. Id. There were 343 exchange-listed reporting ADRs in 1988. Id.
138. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 62-63; COCHRANE, supra note 12, at 7.
139. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 117.
140. Craig Torres, Latin American Firms Break With Past, Scramble to Be
Listed on U.S. Exchanges, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1993, at C1. Reformists argue,
however, that the recent growth in foreign securities listed on the NYSE has
occurred in spite of, not because of, U.S. disclosure requirements. See COCH-
RANE, supra note 12, at 8.
141. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, ADDITIONS/SUSPENSIONS OF NON-U.S. SE-
cuarrrs 2 (1993) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
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instance, "are scrambling to get their stock listed" on U.S.
exchanges. 142
Finally, the reformist position ignores the fundamental link
between SEC disclosure requirements and the superiority of the
national exchanges over the pink-sheet market. The rigorous
disclosure requirements associated with a national exchange
listing have created the very benefits that the exchanges offer
over the pink-sheet market. 143 Investors simply place a calcula-
ble value on the increased disclosure. As a result, companies
benefit through lower costs of capital, higher trading volume,
and more diverse investor participation.1 4 4 If the SEC accepts
foreign accounting standards, the costs of a national exchange
listing will undoubtedly be lower for foreign companies, but the
benefits of an exchange listing may not remain constant. There-
fore, any SEC ruling that recognizes foreign accounting stan-
dards will jeopardize the very institutional benefits now offered
by the national exchanges over the pink-sheet market.145
2. The International Rivalry: The U.S. National Exchanges
and Foreign Exchanges
Similar to the two-tier system that exists in the United
States, an international two-tier market has also developed
along the lines of disclosure requirements. On one tier, the U.S.
national exchanges stand virtually alone, arguably accompanied
by Canada and the United Kingdom.1 46 The other tier is com-
posed of most other major markets, such as Germany and Ja-
142. Torres, supra note 140, at C1. Although Latin American accounting
standards have been heavily influenced by American accounting standards,
Latin American companies still face significant "adjustments for inflation and
under-funded liabilities, such as pension payments and deferred taxes." Id.
These companies are listing on U.S. exchanges to improve liquidity, increase
investor awareness, and adjust to the capital needs of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. Id.
143. See Schapiro, supra note 5; Cox, supra note 19, at 187.
144. See Schapiro, supra note 5; Cox, supra note 19, at 187.
145. Consider this hypothetical example often used to illustrate the di-
lemma faced by the SEC with regard to accepting home-country accounting
standards. Suppose that after dozens of new foreign firms are admitted to the
national exchanges, a major scandal occurs involving a foreign company.
Although the foreign country's more lenient disclosure standards or insider
trading rules are likely at fault, an event such as this would be blamed on the
SEC and its Congressional overseers. The fallout would not only hurt foreign
companies, but it could possibly shake overall investor confidence in the na-
tional exchanges to the point that even U.S. companies would suffer from in-
creased costs of capital. See, e.g., Jarrell, supra note 72.
146. See Biddle & Saudagaran, Effects of Financial Disclosure, supra note
33, at 60.
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pan. 14 7 Like the pink-sheet market in the United States, the
non-U.S. tier is now a formidable competitor for the U.S. na-
tional exchanges. 148 The costs of participation in each tier de-
pend primarily on the registration, reporting, and disclosure
requirements. The benefits offered by each market depend on
the size, breadth, and strength of the market. According to re-
formists, the non-U.S. exchanges now offer a level of benefits
comparable to U.S. exchanges, but with lower costs of
disclosure. 14 9
Despite the alleged uncompetitiveness of the U.S. national
exchanges, the number of foreign listings in the United States
has increased while the number on other foreign exchanges has
declined. As of June 30, 1993, 559 foreign companies were trad-
ing in the United States and complying with U.S. GAAP stan-
dards. 150 There were 562 foreign companies trading on the
London exchange, 352 in Frankfurt, 201 in Paris, and 115 in To-
kyo. '51 An even more compelling indication of U.S. competitive-
ness, however, is the three-year trend of foreign listings on each
exchange. The United States has gained 120 foreign listings in
the last three years, 15 2 while London has lost 40, Tokyo has lost
10, and the other exchanges have remained relatively con-
stant.15 3 The fact that foreign listings have increased on U.S.
exchanges, while other foreign exchanges have lost listings, indi-
cates that the United States still offers superior benefits to for-
eign issuers over other foreign exchanges.
The dollar volume of offerings in the United States demon-
strates a similar trend. Since 1981 the dollar volume of public
offerings in the United States has climbed steadily. 5 4 Like the
number of listings, the largest gains in dollar volume have oc-
curred since 1990.155 In 1991 and 1992 respectively, $14.8 bil-
147. Id.
148. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 58.
149. See id.; Freund, supra note 5.
150. Schapiro, supra note 5. The number of foreign firms listed in the
United States further increased to 575 by September 30, 1993. SEC OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS RELEASES, REPORTING FOREIGN ISSUERS AS OF SEPT. 30,
1993 (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
151. Schapiro, supra note 5.
152. Id. From 1989 to 1993, there were 203 new foreign securities listings
in the United States. Breeden, supra note 119, at 516. There were 121 foreign
company public offerings in 1992 alone. Id.
153. Schapiro, supra note 5.
154. See SEC OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, FOREIGN COMPANY PRIVATE
PLACEMENTS AND PUBLIC OFFERINGS (1993) (on file with the Minnesota Journal
of Global Trade).
155. See id.
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lion and $18.7 billion of equity was publicly offered by foreign
companies in the United States. 156 In the first half of 1993
alone, nearly $16.3 billion of foreign securities was publicly of-
fered in the United States. 157 The number and dollar volume of
foreign listings in the United States demonstrate that the
globalization of securities markets has not impeded the competi-
tiveness of the U.S. national exchanges.
B. STEMMING U.S. CAPITAL FLIGHT
As the globalization of securities markets progresses, U.S.
investors continue to lead the way.158 U.S. investors are in-
creasingly investing in other developed countries and emerging
markets in the search for higher yields and the desire to globally
diversify their portfolios. 159 Consequently, U.S. investors are
exposing themselves to considerably more risk while incurring
greater expenses. 16 0 The greater risks of international investing
are a function of currency fluctuations, foreign political instabil-
ity, volatile foreign economic conditions, and the lack of investor
safeguards such as are available in the United States. 161 The
added expense of international investing is a result of higher
transaction costs incurred when trading in other markets. 162
Even small investors who invest internationally through global
mutual funds incur greater transaction costs in the form of
higher management fees. 163
Reformists allege that despite the added risks and expense,
U.S. investors are circumventing the SEC and its protection by
investing overseas at record levels.' 64 Therefore, they argue
that the SEC should keep these foreign securities trades in the
United States by encouraging more foreign listings through
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
159. Jeanne B. Pinder, Americans Rush to Funds That Invest Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, at D1. The amount of new funds invested in foreign eq-
uity mutual funds is now nearly half of all new mutual fund investments. Id.
In August 1993 alone, $5.4 billion flowed into foreign equity mutual funds, and
from January to October 1993 a total of $17.4 billion was invested. Id. By con-
trast, in all of 1992 only $6.9 billion flowed into foreign equity mutual funds.
Id.
160. Edwards, supra note 6, at 63; Freund, supra note 5.
161. See generally WARFIELD, supra note 45, at 20-21 (1985).
162. Edwards, supra note 6, at 63-64.
163. Id. at 64.
164. See Freund, supra note 5; Edwards, supra note 6, at 62.
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lower U.S. disclosure requirements. 165 By accepting home-coun-
try accounting standards, the SEC would provide foreign issuers
with an even greater incentive to raise capital or list securities
in the United States. More importantly, reformists claim that
U.S. investors would benefit from the ability to trade more for-
eign securities in the United States, with lower trading costs,
higher liquidity, and recourse under U.S. antifraud laws.166 Fi-
nally, the U.S. securities industry and U.S. economy would ben-
efit from more foreign listings as a result of increased trade and
employment. 167
However, the fact that large amounts of capital are cur-
rently flowing overseas does not in itself warrant wholesale
abandonment of stringent U.S. disclosure laws. The amount of
funds invested abroad is still relatively small in comparison to
domestically invested funds. 168 For example, of the $5 trillion of
American institutional and mutual fund assets, less than seven
percent is invested in foreign securities. 169 Moreover, large cap-
ital outflows are not necessarily due to U.S. capital market inad-
equacies. Capital is currently flowing overseas in record
amounts, primarily due to the higher yields available in foreign
markets. 170 The increasing level of overseas investment is thus
a natural result of the celebrated globalization of securities mar-
kets. In fact, the United States will likely be the largest partici-
pant in the global securities market, given the enormous
amount of capital at its disposal. Even if reformists are correct
in assuming that accepting foreign accounting standards will in-
crease the number of foreign listings on U.S. exchanges, the
forces of globalization are simply too powerful to stem the flow of
U.S. capital abroad.
Finally, despite the fact that some investors are willing to
succumb to the greater risks associated with foreign markets
and their lower disclosure levels, the average U.S. investor
should not be put at risk. 171 The comprehensive disclosure re-
165. See Freund, supra note 5; Edwards, supra note 6.
166. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 7, at 12 (testimony of William H. Don-
aldson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, New York Stock Exchange).
167. See McLaughlin, supra note 12, at 91 (concluding that U.S. broker-
dealers lose business as a result of U.S. capital flight). For a discussion of the
impact and importance of the securities industry on the U.S. economy, see
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
168. See Pinder, supra note 159, at Dl.
169. Duffy & Murray, supra note 3; see also Pinder, supra note 159, at D1.
170. Pinder, supra note 159, at D1.
171. See James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in an Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FoRDHAm L. REV. S77, S89 (1992).
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quired in the United States lowers the risks of entry for small
investors.172
C. THE EFFICIENCY OF SECURITIEs EXCHANGES
Another major foundation of the reformist movement is
based on the comparable levels of market efficiency that exist in
U.S. exchanges and other foreign exchanges. 173 Market effi-
ciency is determined by the ability of investors to quickly reflect
newly disclosed information into securities prices. 174 If buyers
and sellers effectively incorporate new information immediately
upon release, arbitrage opportunities-the ability of investors to
make consistently superior returns based on technical or funda-
mental analysis-will be eliminated. 7 5
Numerous studies indicate that other major foreign ex-
changes are just as efficient as U.S. exchanges. 176 Thus, inves-
tors on the Tokyo, London, or New York stock exchanges cannot
consistently profit from technical analysis or fundamental anal-
ysis. Reformists therefore contend that the additional disclosure
U.S. investors who wish to invest overseas while minimizing the risks and
transaction costs can readily do so through foreign securities mutual funds.
Jarrell, supra note 72.
172. See Schapiro, supra note 5.
173. See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 5, at 39-40, 46-51; Freund, supra
note 5; Edwards, supra note 6, at 64-66. But see Hearings, supra note 7, at 12
(testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
NYSE, stating that foreign markets "generally offer less efficient trading and
settlement practices than U.S. markets, and certainly offer less protection to
U.S. investors").
174. See, e.g., Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 5, at 47. The degree of a mar-
ket's efficiency depends on several factors, including the level of institutional or
professional participation, the liquidity of a market, and the speed and ease
with which transactions occur. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 289-309 (4th ed. 1991) (explain-
ing the Efficient Market Hypothesis and its implications in finance).
175. Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 5, at 39-40. Technical analysts study
past securities prices to predict future cycles of securities prices. BREALEY &
MYERS, supra note 174, at 295. Fundamental analysts study an individual com-
pany's business and financial data to uncover mispriced securities. Id. These
two types of investment techniques are ultimately what make markets efficient.
Id.
176. See Gabriel Hawawini, European Equity Markets: Price Behavior and
Efficiency, in 4/5 MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FINANCE AND ECONOMICS (Anthony
Sanders ed., 1984) (concluding that European markets are equally efficient af-
ter reviewing numerous studies); Robert E. Cumby & Jack D. Glen, Evaluating
the Performance of International Mutual Funds, 45 J. OF FIN. 497 (1990);
Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 5, at 39-40, 46-51.
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in the United States is without value to investors because for-
eign exchanges are equally as efficient as U.S. exchanges.
17 7
Even if U.S. exchanges and foreign exchanges are equally
efficient, however, the conclusion drawn by reformists assumes
that market efficiency and disclosure levels interact. More spe-
cifically, reformists assume that the speed with which a market
incorporates new information enables policymakers to identify
the optimal amount of financial disclosure.
To examine the relationship, if any, between market effi-
ciency and disclosure levels, consider two hypothetical capital
markets at the opposite extremes of disclosure levels. Market A
requires comprehensive, segmented, and fully annotated finan-
cial statements similar to those required in the United States.
Market Z requires the disclosure of only one item, net income.
As information is released in each market about a particular
company, investors will buy and sell based on their evaluation of
the newly released information. As a result, the prices of securi-
ties in both markets will eventually reflect the newly released
information. 178 The speed with which each market incorporates
the new information determines its degree of efficiency. Yet, re-
gardless of how efficient Markets A and Z are, empirical studies
have shown that securities prices in both markets will eventu-
ally reflect that market's best estimate of a company's risk and
required rate of return. 179 Securities prices in Market A, how-
ever, will reflect more information due to the higher level of
disclosure.
The fact that both Market A and Market Z will eventually
reflect all publicly available information, despite their unequal
disclosure levels, indicates that the degree of efficiency in each
market is independent of the disclosure level. Market A and
Market Z further illustrate that the reformist's reliance on mar-
ket efficiency is misguided, due to the confusion of two very dis-
tinct concepts of efficiency: trading efficiency and productive
efficiency.
177. See, e.g., Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 5, at 51.
178. All public information will eventually be reflected in securities prices
because arbitragers will continually trade until the opportunity for excess re-
turns is eliminated.
179. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 24-2 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: 11, 46-5 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); BRIGHAM & GAPINSKI, supra note 94, at
250. These tests have shown that technical and fundamental analysis cannot
be used to consistently outperform the market. See id.
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Trading efficiency, commonly referred to as market effi-
ciency, measures the ability of a market to eliminate arbitrage
opportunities by incorporating new information into securities
prices. 180 By contrast, productive efficiency measures the accu-
racy with which a market adjusts securities prices.' 8 ' Each con-
cept is concerned with a unique aspect of market information.
Trading efficiency is concerned with the speed with which infor-
mation is used to adjust securities prices and thereby determine
a company's cost of capital, while productive efficiency is con-
cerned with the amount of information used. A greater level of
disclosure will reduce the level of uncertainty faced by investors
and permit a more efficient allocation of capital among
companies. 182
Therefore, the level of disclosure in a market primarily im-
pacts a market's productive efficiency, rather than, as reformists
assert, its trading efficiency. Market A and Market Z can both
be perfectly trading efficient, that is, they can both instantane-
ously eliminate arbitrage opportunities. At the same time, how-
ever, Market A is more productively efficient. Market A is more
productively efficient because the greater level of information
available will permit a more precise allocation of capital among
high and low quality companies. Investors in Market A will use
the highly detailed, company-specific information available to
individually assign costs of capital to each company. Investors
in Market Z, however, will merely assign average costs of capital
to all companies due to the lack of detailed information. High-
quality companies in Market Z will be forced to effectively subsi-
dize inferior companies due to the inability of investors to distin-
180. See supra note 174 for factors that effect the degree of a market's trad-
ing efficiency.
181. See MAuTZ, supra note 32, at 43, 78-79 (explaining that a market's abil-
ity to effectively distribute scarce resources is essential to long-run increases in
productivity). A security or portfolio of securities is accurately priced when it
provides the highest expected return for a given level of risk, or the lowest de-
gree of risk for an expected return. See, e.g., BRIGHAM & GAPENSKI, supra note
94, at 120, 126, 139-55. When securities are accurately priced in a capital mar-
ket (i.e., the market is productively efficient) the market will achieve its ulti-
mate function: the allocation of an economy's scarce resources to the most
productive activities. MAUTZ, supra note 32, at 43, 77.
The SEC also refers to productive efficiency as "operational efficiency."
KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 134.
182. See MAUrZ, supra note 32, at 28-29. The more effectively capital is dis-
tributed in an economy, the more likely a society is to achieve the primary eco-
nomic goal of increasing production. Id. at 43.
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guish among them.' 8 3 Therefore, although these two markets
can be identical in terms of trading efficiency, Market A benefits
from greater disclosure in the form of more a precise allocation
of capital-i.e., greater productive efficiency.
This example suggests several important points about dif-
ferent disclosure levels. First, companies in a high disclosure
market will be assigned a more accurate cost of capital. Second,
investment will be lower in countries with lower levels of disclo-
sure.' 8 4 Investment in a low disclosure economy will be lower
because investors are unable to distinguish between high and
low risk companies and this ultimately makes equity invest-
ments less attractive overall.'8 5 Finally, and most importantly,
the concept of trading efficiency is of little value in the debate
over the optimal level of disclosure in the United States.
Consequently, the proposition that foreign exchanges are
just as efficient as U.S. exchanges lends little support to the re-
formist movement. A market can be perfectly trading efficient
regardless of how much disclosure is required- even in a mar-
ket with zero disclosure. Although disclosure levels of major
world markets lie on a tighter continuum than that of the Mar-
ket A and Market Z example, the optimal level of disclosure in a
market is not determined by market (or trading) efficiency.18 6
D. THE SEARCH FOR AN OPTIMAL LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE AND
THE PRIVATE INCENTIVE TO DISCLOSE
An obvious solution to the financial disclosure debate is to
establish international accounting standards.18 7 Several orga-
nizations have been negotiating international standards for de-
183. In a low disclosure market, high quality companies will effectively sub-
sidize low quality companies by lowering the cost of capital that would other-
wise be charged to low quality companies. The cost of capital for low quality
companies would be lowered because of the inability of investors to differentiate
between high and low quality companies. In short, all companies would pay an
industry average cost of capital, with high quality companies paying too much
and low quality companies paying too little.
184. Cf. MAUTZ, supra note 32, at 29 (stating that companies that do not
disclose sufficient information will be deemed unattractive investments and
will likely go unfunded).
185. See id.
186. If foreign markets were shown to be as productively efficient as the
U.S. market despite their lower disclosure requirements, the conclusion could
then be drawn that some of the SEC disclosure requirements are without value.
See Edwards, supra note 6, at 64-65. However, this type of evidence is very
difficult to produce. Id. at 64.
187. The NYSE, for example, supports the efforts to establish international
accounting standards as a viable long-run solution to the disclosure debate.
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cades. 188 However, until the prolonged steps of international
negotiations actually produce a comprehensive set of interna-
tional standards, the SEC is committed to preserving the preem-
inent position of the U.S. securities markets with the current
disclosure system.
While reformists continue to lobby for a short-term solution
to the purported U.S. disclosure disadvantage, it is important to
consider the effects of maintaining the current disclosure re-
quirements in a globalized capital market. If U.S. disclosure
laws do impose additional costs on foreign issuers, basic econom-
ics suggests that foreign companies will seek listings elsewhere
unless the added benefits of a U.S. listing are substantial. If the
marginal benefits equal the marginal costs, foreign issuers
should be indifferent between exchanges. Although each com-
pany's estimate of the costs and benefits will differ,'8 9 recent ac-
tivity in foreign listings indicates that foreign companies still
place a positive value on a U.S. listing. Indeed, as previously
noted, the number of foreign listings in the United States contin-
ues to rise while other foreign exchanges have stabilized or de-
clined in foreign participation. 190 Moreover, the relative
number of foreign companies that trade on the U.S. national ex-
changes, as compared to the pink-sheet market, has substan-
Hearings, supra note 7, at 13 (testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer, New York Stock Exchange).
188. The organization with the most promise is currently the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Abdel M. Agami, Global Accounting
Standards and Competitiveness of U.S. Corporations, MULTINATIONAL Bus.
REV., Spring 1993, at 38, 42. The IASC has representatives from 75 nations
and follows a democratic process in the establishment of accounting standards.
Id. The SEC has been actively involved with the IASC in its efforts to establish
international accounting standards. 1991 SEC ANN. RPrr. at 66. The United
Nations and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) are also involved in the pursuit of international accounting standards.
See Agami, supra, at 42; Edwards, supra note 6, at 70.
Other organizations are committed to establishing accounting standards
for certain geographic regions. The European Union has 12 member nations
and periodically issues "directives" that provide guidance to its member nations
on accounting and disclosure matters. Agami, supra, at 42. Other organiza-
tions with similar commitments include: the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), which has 24 member nations that represent
most industrialized countries; the Asociacion Interamericana de Contabilidad
(AIC), which has 21 member nations representing North and South American
countries; and the Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants (CAPA),
which has 20 member nations from the Pacific Rim. GERHARD G. MUELLER ET
AL., ACCOUNTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 46-48 (2d ed. 1991).
189. See generally Biddle & Saudagaran, Foreign Stock Listings, supra note
33, at 69-74 (discussing the benefits and costs of a foreign listing).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
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tially increased since 1988,191 and the NYSE continues to list
record numbers of foreign companies. 192 Trends such as these
indicate that the higher disclosure levels in the United States
still confer superior benefits to foreign companies.
However, the superior benefits associated with a U.S. na-
tional exchange listing may not be purely a function of more
stringent U.S. disclosure laws. The benefits of detailed disclo-
sure may also be attributable to market demand. Investors in
the United States and around the world have created a signifi-
cant private incentive for companies to disclose information. 193
The primary incentive for a company is to lower its cost of capi-
tal.' 94 Companies which feel that more disclosure will lower
their cost of capital will do so regardless of the statutory disclo-
sure requirements. 195 Eventually, companies which choose not
to disclose detailed financial information will be assessed a
higher cost of capital because investors will assume the worst
about the company.' 96 Even marginal companies will have an
incentive to disclose information to avoid being associated with
high risk companies. In theory, investors could make low disclo-
sure requirements irrelevant by charging costly risk premiums
191. See supra text accompanying note 139.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
193. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 61; KRIPxE, supra note 29, at 124. Vol-
untary disclosure routinely occurs in the U.S. private placement market as well
as in U.S. venture capital transactions. Id. at 118-22. Voluntary disclosure
was common even before the SEC and U.S. securities law existed. Edwards,
supra note 6, at 62. Voluntary disclosure also occurs in foreign markets, see
infra note 198 and accompanying text.
The private incentive for a company to disclose information has been called
the "lemons problem." SANFORD GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATION ROLE OF PRICES
166-89 (1989). For example, consider the case of a product produced by many
companies, some high quality and some low quality. If there is no way for high
quality producers to distinguish themselves from low quality producers, all
products will sell for the same price. Id. However, if the high quality producers
can distinguish themselves by disclosing information about the quality of their
product, prices will vary. 1d. The companies that disclose less than full infor-
mation will sell for the lowest price because consumers will assume that non-
disclosing companies produce the lowest quality products. Id. at 166.
The "lemons problem" applies to investments as well. Companies which do
not disclose sufficient information will be deemed unattractive investments and
will likely go unfunded. MAuTz, supra note 32, at 29.
194. See MAuTz, supra note 32, at 29.
195. See Clifford W. Smith, On Trading Foreign Securities in U.S. Markets,
in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION 77, 79 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert
Kamphuis eds., 1992).
196. Id.; see also supra note 193.
[Vol. 3:301
FOREIGN SECURITIES LISTINGS
to dissuade companies from disclosing only the statutory mini-
mum amount of information. 197
Many companies already realize the advantage of disclosing
more information than is required by their home country or ex-
change. 198 The Swiss company, Nestle, is a visible example.
Nestld voluntarily discloses information that conforms to the ac-
counting principles developed by the International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC). 99 The IASC's disclosure stan-
dards are sufficiently detailed to allow Nestl6 to list on most of
Europe's exchanges. 200 Nestle's incentive for voluntarily dis-
closing detailed financial information is the desire to lower its
cost of capital. As more companies take advantage of the private
incentive to disclose information, the incentive to do so will be-
come even more powerful. In other words, the remaining com-
panies will be subject to increasing risk premiums due to their
unwillingness to satisfy investors' demand for voluntary
disclosure.
Private incentives to disclose information will also increase
as companies become less able to rely on market structural fac-
tors that limit the need to disclose information. Many foreign
countries have capital market structures that minimize the de-
mand for disclosure. Japanese companies, for example, are di-
vided into business groups whose members own the vast
majority of each other's equity. 201 The need for disclosure is
thus limited, given that only a small amount of each company's
stock is publicly-owned and traded.20 2 In Germany, financial in-
stitutions provide the bulk of capital needed by companies, and
197. Investors will assess higher risk premiums by lowering a company's
stock price. All other things equal, a lower stock price raises a company's cost of
capital.
198. Continental European firms listed on the London Stock Exchange regu-
larly disclose more information than is required by the exchange. G. K Meek &
S. J. Gray, Globalization of Stock Markets and Foreign Listing Requirements:
Voluntary Disclosures by Continental European Companies Listed on the
London Stock Exchange, 20 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES, 315, 326-33 (1989). The pri-
mary reasons identified for the voluntary disclosure were the competitive pres-
sures incurred in the international capital markets. Id. at 320-21, 332-33.
199. No More EC Directives on Accounting Standards and Practices, Bus.
Europe, July 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File. See
supra note 188.
200. Id.
201. THUROW, supra note 23, at 134-36. Seventy-eight percent of the shares
listed on the Tokyo stock exchange are owned by business group members.
Carla Rapoport, Why Japan Keeps on Winning, FORTUNE, July 15, 1991, at 72,
85.
202. See Rapoport, supra note 201, at 85.
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use this dependency to impose significant control over corporate
governance. 20 3 The Deutsche Bank of Germany alone owns
more than a ten percent stake in seventy companies, and its ex-
ecutives sit on more than four hundred corporate boards.20 4
With the enormous costs of German reunification, however,
large companies can no longer rely on their domestic financial
system.20 5 As a result, large German companies such as
Daimler-Benz now have a significant incentive to disclose more
detailed information in order to access the world's largest securi-
ties exchanges-the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.
The German situation exemplifies the powerful effects of
globalization. To benefit from international listings, companies
must now satisfy different investor demands throughout the
world. As globalization progresses, the private incentive to dis-
close detailed information will grow stronger. The search for in-
ternational disclosure standards may thus arrive sooner than
anticipated as investors create implicit disclosure minimums.
Meanwhile, the purported disadvantage of the U.S. national ex-
changes will diminish as high disclosure levels become the
norm.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pressure continues to mount on the SEC to relax U.S. dis-
closure laws for foreign companies. The principal argument is
that U.S. accounting standards pose a significant barrier to en-
try and thus threaten the preeminence of U.S. capital markets.
However, the U.S. national exchanges show no signs of weaken-
ing in their ability to compete for foreign listings. In fact, evi-
dence illustrates that the U.S. national exchanges continue to
outpace the U.S. pink-sheet market and foreign exchanges in
the foreign listings market.
In addition, the fact that U.S. investors continue to invest
capital overseas in record amounts lends little support to the
current reformist movement. This trend is a natural result of
the globalization of securities markets which makes it possible
to easily capitalize on worldwide disparities in interest rates and
203. Corinne A. Franzen, Note, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Cor-
porations: Is Bank Monitoring the Answer?, 2 Mimr. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 284-
87 (1993). See also Duffy & Murray, supra note 3.
204. THuRow, supra note 23, at 34. The Deutsche Bank even owns 28% of
Daimler-Benz. Id.
205. Company Law: Daimler-Benz New York Listing May Impact on ECI US
Talks on Accounts Standards, European Information Service, July 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
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investment opportunities. Moreover, the fact that foreign ex-
changes are equally as trading efficient as U.S. exchanges is im-
material. The amount of information disclosed in a market
affects a market's productive efficiency, not its trading
efficiency.
The globalization of securities markets may also resolve the
debate over disclosure levels as companies are increasingly
forced to compete internationally for capital. The increased
competition, along with the increase in institutional investor
leverage, has created and will continue to strengthen the incen-
tive for companies to voluntarily disclose detailed financial in-
formation, regardless of statutory disclosure requirements.
Thus, the continued success of the U.S. national exchanges
in acquiring new foreign listings, combined with the powerful
effects of globalization, shed serious doubt on the necessity of
lowering U.S. disclosure standards. If the SEC decides to drasti-
cally alter disclosure standards in order to place the national ex-
changes at par with the pink-sheet market and foreign
exchanges, it must be prepared to risk the efficiency and integ-
rity of the U.S. market that it has developed over the last sixty
years.
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